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Password (In)Security
 Passwords: MAIN authentication tool in the digital era
 Protect our lives and social order, conveniently and Insecurely
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Password (In)Security
 Passwords: MAIN authentication tool in the digital era
 Protect our lives and social order, conveniently and Insecurely
 BILLIONS of passwords stolen
 MySpace 360M, LinkedIn 165M, eBay 145M,…, Yahoo 1B (!!)
 … Twitter, RSA, Google, Dropbox, PayPal, Sony, …
 https://www.leakedsource.com:
 2,918,283,623 accounts at your service.
 "Check for free to see if your email or account was hacked.“
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An Unacceptable State of Affairs   
(but do we have a choice?)
 Unacceptable, really!   Our social order depends on passwords
 But do we have a choice?
 Getting rid of passwords is not realistic: passwords are too convenient, 
and massively deployed.    
 Ask users to memorize (multiple) high-entropy passwords:  No way
 Stop choosing same/related password:  No way
+ it’s often less secure:  users cannot remember changing passwords, so they get 
a new password by email every time they authenticate…
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Can Cryptography Help?
 Yes!
 We show ways to strengthen password protocols for a variety of 
authentication settings, including common settings used today.
 Using simple, well-established techniques 
 Mostly blinded Diffie-Hellman [Chaum, Ford-Kaliski, Boyen, …]      
(“oblivious PRF”)
 Efficient. Mature. Ready for deployment in the real world.
 We will go over three such solutions in this talk.
 Pointers to papers at the end; and please talk to me if you are 
interested to learn more (esp. if you see where we can improve, or if 
you want to transfer this to practice).
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Attacks on Password Authentication  
#1:  Offline Dictionary Attack (ODA)
 ODA is the main source of password compromise: 
 Deadly combination of human memory limitation (low entropy passwords) 
and server compromise
 Attacker who gets hold of a “password file” can test candidate passwords 
against stored hashes; cost proportional to dictionary size
 Millions++ of passwords tested per second  (from s/w to dedicated h/w)
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 ODA is the main source of password compromise: 
 Deadly combination of human memory limitation (low entropy passwords) 
and server compromise
 Attacker who gets hold of a “password file” can test candidate passwords 
against stored hashes; cost proportional to dictionary size
 Millions++ of passwords tested per second  (from s/w to dedicated h/w)
 Offline attacks upon server compromise are unavoidable 
 If the server can check pwd given password file then so can the attacker
 Server holds H(pwd) for known deterministic function H (= a hash function)
 Password salting slows the attack but does not eliminate it in practice
 For each account server holds H(pwd,s) for $ “salt” value s: 
To test pwd, attacker has to compute H(pwd,) separately for each account
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Hope: Render these unavoidable exhaustive attacks ineffective!
How:  Enforce high-entropy passwords using additional devices/servers
 What Devices?
 Cell phone, USB stick:  Already used in Two-Factor Authentication
 What Servers?
 Can be hosted by any cloud service
 End-users can utilize it transparently to web servers
 Web servers can utilize it transparently to end-users
Attacks on Password Authentication  
#2,3,4,5
2. Online dict. attacks (unavoidable):  Guess password; try it online.
▪ Works w/weak pwds and in targeted attacks (pers. info, sister pwd) [Wang’16]
3. Phishing attack: User tricked to send password to the wrong server
▪ paypa1.com, overwritten links in email, URL-browser manipulation, …
4. PKI attacks: Browser tricked to accept as valid a fake certificate 
▪ Cert signed by an authorized but rogue CA (do you know your browser’s CA’s?)
▪ A certificate flagged by the browser but user accepts (by “clicking through”)
5. Malware on the client (terminal, laptop, phone), e.g. keyloggers
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5. Malware on the client (terminal, laptop, phone), e.g. keyloggers
How can we help?
Attacks on Password Authentication  
#2,3,4,5
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#2:  Can be rendered ineffective if 2nd authentication factor 
sads (cell phone, USB stick) used appropriately [our TFA work…]

(with TFA)
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
“Security w/o PKI”
(simple crypto + 
browser extension)
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
(with TFA)
# 3,4 stem from over-reliance on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI):  
Client uses wrong PK  Attacker learns pwd
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
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# 3,4 stem from over-reliance on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI):  
Client uses wrong PK  Attacker learns pwd
▪ PAKE’s (“Password Auth. Key Exchange”) [BPR’00,BMP’00,…,…,…]
make Pwd. Auth. secure (up to online attacks) without trust in PKI 
at cost  TLS/SSL session ( 2exp per client/server, 2-3 rounds) 
▪ Our work offers security without PKI (+ no ODA on Server + TFA + …)
Attacks on Password Authentication  
#2,3,4,5
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
“Security w/o PKI”
(simple crypto + 
browser extension)
2. Online dict. attacks (unavoidable):  Guess password; try it online.
▪ Works w/weak pwds and in targeted attacks (pers. info, sister pwd) [Wang’16]
3. Phishing attack: User tricked to send password to the wrong server
▪ paypa1.com, overwritten links in email, URL-browser manipulation, …
4. PKI attacks: Browser tricked to accept as valid a fake certificate 
▪ Cert signed by an authorized but rogue CA (do you know your browser’s CA’s?)
▪ A certificate flagged by the browser but user accepts (by “clicking through”)
5. Malware on the client (terminal, laptop, phone), e.g. keyloggers

(with TFA)
# 5:  Help from 2nd factor (same as #2):  Adversary needs to 
corrupt the password and the 2nd auth. factor (= cell phone, USB, …)

(with TFA)
Outline for rest of the talk
1. Sphinx:  Improving Password Authentication via Password Store      
(= auxiliary device / online security server)    [JKSS’16,JKSS’17]
▪ Extension to Two-Factor Authentication     [In submission]
2. Generalized Password-Store: Password-Protected Secret Sharing 
[BJSL’11, JKK’14, JKKX’16, JKKX’17] 
3. XPAKE:  Implementing private salt in PKI-free PAKE     [In preparation]
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Part I: 
Removing Offline Dictionary Attacks 
on Server Compromise
Intuition: Use secure key to securely map: 
memorizable password   full-entropy passwords 
(so servers can safely store their hashes)
= “Password Store” security service
25
Simple solution: Password Store 
(a.k.a. password manager )
 Carry strong independent passwords:
 stored … in your phone, your smart watch, …, or retrievable online 
 … encrypted under a master password
 Just remember one master password (hopefully non-trivial)
26
Master 
Pwd
Graphic zoho.com
Password store: Not without problems
 A list of user passwords encrypted under the user’s master password
 Attacker obtains the list  Offline Attack against master password              
( all the user’s passwords compromised)
 Client compromise: Attacker learns master password as user types it
 User-device communication compromise:  master password leaked
 Furthermore: Typical password managers keep user-chosen passwords
(hence, weak, and related/repeated)
 Can we do better?
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A dream password store
 All passwords in a password store kept in user’s device or online 
 Using network (device or online) storage/crypto service is OK 
because web authentication requires data connectivity anyway
 User memorizes a single master password 
 Individual pwd’s are random and independent of each other
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A dream password store
 All passwords in a password store kept in user’s device or online 
 Using network (device or online) storage/crypto service is OK 
because web authentication requires data connectivity anyway
 User memorizes a single master password 
 Individual pwd’s are random and independent of each other
 And: An attacker who gets hold of store and/or is in                 
full control of the device… still learns nothing:
 Adversary does not learn individual stored passwords
 Adversary does not learn the master password
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What do you mean by nothing ?      
 Well… nothing.  As in information-theoretic nothing!        
1. Information stored in the device is independent of the user’s 
individual passwords and independent of the master password
2. Attacker inside the device, w/full control, does not learn either 
the master password or individual passwords (not even at init!)
3. Eavesdropper or active attacker on the client-device link learns nothing
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What do you mean by nothing ?      
 Well… nothing.  As in information-theoretic nothing!        
1. Information stored in the device is independent of the user’s 
individual passwords and independent of the master password
2. Attacker inside the device, w/full control, does not learn either 
the master password or individual passwords (not even at init!)
3. Eavesdropper or active attacker on the client-device link learns nothing
 How is it possible?
By (a form of) secret-sharing between master password and device key
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SPHINX: Password Store that Perfectly Hides from Itself
(No Xaggeration) [JKSS’16, JKSS’17]
SPHINX [JKSS’17]
based on Device-Enhanced PAKE [JKSS’16]
 A password Store that Perfectly Hides from Itself
 Really?  
Let me show you our solution…
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PRF-based Solution
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Kd
pwd
pwd
PRF(Kd, pwd)
rwd  PRF(Kd, pwd) )
rwd
1
3
5
2
4
• pwd is the master password
• rwd is a (pseudo) random password that user registers with some server
PRF : PseudoRandom Function 
(eg. Block Cipher)
Think:  PRF(K,x) = AES(K,x)
?
PRF-based Solution
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Kd
pwd
pwd
PRF(Kd, pwd)
rwd  PRF(Kd, pwd) )
rwd
1
3
5
2
4
• pwd is the master password
• rwd is a (pseudo) random password that user registers with some server
• Each server has independent rwd, namely rwd = PRF(Kd, pwd | url)
• Works with any password protocol between client and server
PRF : PseudoRandom Function 
(eg. Block Cipher)
Think:  PRF(K,x) = AES(K,x)
?
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Kd
pwd
pwd
PRF(Kd, pwd|url)
rwd
1
3
5
2
4
☺ each rwd is a (pseudo) random password  offline attacks are infeasible
☺ storage in device (Kd) is independent of master pwd and of rwd’s
 master pwd is sent unprotected to device
?
PRF : PseudoRandom Function 
(eg. Block Cipher)
Think:  PRF(K,x) = AES(K,x)PRF-based Solution
rwd  PRF(Kd, pwd|url) )
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☺ each rwd is a (pseudo) random password  offline attacks are infeasible
☺ storage in device (Kd) is independent of master pwd and of rwd’s
☺ master pwd hidden over the wire and from the device
PRF : PseudoRandom Function 
(eg. Block Cipher)
Think:  PRF(K,x) = AES(K,x)OPRF-based Solution
Oblivious 
PRF
(onetime)
OPRF-based Solution
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pwd
pwd
PRF(Kd, pwd)
rwd  PRF(Kd, pwd)      
rwd
1
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Oblivious 
PRF
☺ each rwd is a (pseudo) random password  offline attacks are infeasible
☺ storage in device (Kd) is independent of master pwd and of rwd’s
☺ master pwd hidden over the wire and from the device
Oblivious PRF:  next slide 
shows it’s not that hard…
PRF : PseudoRandom Function 
(eg. Block Cipher)
Think:  PRF(K,x) = AES(K,x)
(onetime)
Implementation: PRF(Kd,pwd) = (H(pwd))
K
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Kd
pwd
a = (H(pwd))r
b = aKd
rwd = b1/r  
= H(pwd)Kd
rwd
1
3
5
2
4
☺ ☺ each rwd is pseudo-random  ; Kd fully independent of pwd and of rwd
☺☺ master pwd is perfectly hidden on the wire and from device
d
r$
(onetime)
Compare e.g. to RSA signature: 
sig = H(msg)d for RSA private key d
If h = 𝐻 𝑝𝑤𝑑 then  𝑃𝑅𝐹 𝐾, 𝑝𝑤𝑑 = ℎ𝐾
Note:
𝑏1/𝑟 = (𝑎𝐾)1/𝑟= ((ℎ𝑟)𝐾)1/𝑟= ℎ𝑟∗𝐾∗1/𝑟 = ℎ𝐾
Implementation: PRF(Kd,pwd) = (H(pwd))
K
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Kd
pwd
a = (H(pwd))r
b = aKd
rwd = b1/r  
= H(pwd)Kd
rwd
1
3
5
2
4
SERVER TRANSPARENT:  Can use any Client-Server Password Protocol 
use cases:   (1) web standard “pwd-over-TLS”, relies on PKI;   (2) PKI-free PAKE 
Compare e.g. to RSA signature: 
sig = H(msg)d for RSA private key d
r$
(onetime)
If h = 𝐻 𝑝𝑤𝑑 then  𝑃𝑅𝐹 𝐾, 𝑝𝑤𝑑 = ℎ𝐾
Note:
𝑏1/𝑟 = (𝑎𝐾)1/𝑟= ((ℎ𝑟)𝐾)1/𝑟= ℎ𝑟∗𝐾∗1/𝑟 = ℎ𝐾
d
☺ ☺ each rwd is pseudo-random  ; Kd fully independent of pwd and of rwd
☺☺ master pwd is perfectly hidden on the wire and from device
Not only secure…
 Performance: Single round C-D,  1 exponentiation for D,  2 for C,    
and one hash into group for C (any “DiffieHellman” group works) 
 SPHINX pwd manager: Implementation as Android app + usability study 
(user only inputs master pwd, rest is automated) – see references
 Server transparent (works with Google, Facebook, your employer…)
 No need to protect against an eavesdropper (self-protected by SPHINX) 
or to authenticate user/client to device
 Requires device authentication to the client (if Client-Server 
authentication protocol is PKI-based “password-over-TLS”)
 Can replace “personal device” (cell-phone) with online service
 pwd, rwd never seen by server; client-to-server authentication not req’d
server needs to authenticate to client (for pwd-over-tls) 
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SPHINX Security
 Device compromise:  unconditional security of pwd/rwd
 Server compromise:  unconditional security of pwd (and rwd)
 Offline against master pwd ONLY if both server and device compromised
 Network attacks:  only (unavoidable) on-line attacks
 Against client:  only if PKI keys fail
 Against server:  only if Device responds to attacker
 Client compromise:  Partial defense (rwd useless in another server,  
master pwd useless w/o device, url hashing prevents phishing)
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Two-Factor Authentication (TFA) with stronger security and usability 
(improves Sphinx security against Client compromise and network attacks)
How to Protect* a Valuable** Secret 
When all You Remember is a Password 
43
* Protect:  Secrecy and Availability
** Bitcoin wallet, user-controlled cloud backup, secure msging
keys, private key for a PK credential, corporate keys,…
Part II: 
How to store a secret
 Protect secrecy and availability of information while remembering a 
single password
 Need a multi-server solution
 Single server  Single point of failure for secrecy (offline dict. attacks) 
and availability (server gone  secret gone)
 Natural cryptographic solution: keep the secret encrypted in multiple 
locations;  secret share the encryption key  in multiple servers
 Share among n servers, retrieve from t+1 servers (e.g. n=5, t=2)
 Protects secrecy and availability
 Secret: As long as no more than t corrupted
 Available: As long as t+1 available
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Wait, but how do you authenticate to 
each server for share retrieval?
 Server needs to authenticate the user before delivering a share  
 All we have is a user and a password
 A strong independent password with each server?  Not realistic
 Same (or slight-variant) password for each server?  Not good
 Each server as a single point of failure!
 From one point of failure to n. We didn’t achieve much, did we?
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What we really want: PPSS [BJSL’11]
(Password Protected Secret Sharing)
 Init: User secret shares a secret among n servers; forgets secret 
and keeps a single password.
 Retrieval: User contacts t + 1 servers, authenticates using the   
single password and reconstructs the secret.
 Security: Attacker that breaks into t servers learns nothing about 
secret or password
 Even if it and finds all the server’s secret information (shares, long-term 
keys, password file, etc) 
 Only adversary option: Guess the password, try it in an online attack
 Offline attacks with  ≤ t  corrupted servers are useless
+ Soundness: User reconstructs the correct secret or else rejects
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We show surprisingly efficient PPSS schemes 
[BJSL’11, JKK’14, JKKX’16, JKKX’17]
 Computation:
 Single exponentiation for each server
 Only two exponentiations in total for the client (independent of t and n)
 t multiplications (additions in ECC) for client and for each server
 Communication: Single parallel message from user to t+1 servers,    
one message back from each server;  No inter-server communication
 No assumed PKI or secure channels (other than for initialization)
 Any t, n  (t ≤ n)
 Implies Threshold-PAKE  (most efficient T-PAKE’s to date)
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Basis for Efficient PPSS Solution: OPRF
 Recall SPHINX used OPRF to transform pwd into random secret rwd
 To store secret x:  Use OPRF to transform pwd into random rwd; 
store c = AuthEnc(rwd, x)
 To retrieve x: Retrieve c; use OPRF to transform pwd into rwd;      
set m = AuthDec(rwd, c)
 Single server solution: r = OPRFk(pwd) = (H(pwd))
k for k = server’s key
 Multi-server solution: Threshold implementation of OPRF
 n-out-of-n:   Let k = k1 + k2 + … + kn
OPRFk(pwd) = (H(pwd))
k1 ● (H(pwd))k2 ● … ● (H(pwd))kn
 k-out-of-n:   Use Shamir secret-sharing in the exponent
 Note: Can accommodate additional inputs, e.g. object/key identifier
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JKKX’16  any    ROM   CRS none    2  O(t log n) t+2 | 1 
Comparison to Prior Work                  
(PPSS and T-PAKE)
49
JKK’14
JKKX’17  any    ROM   CRS none    2  O(t log n) 2 | 1 
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Part III: X-PAKE* 
(in preparation)
Enhanced Password Security for the             
Single-Server Setting (without PKI)
*Follows from (1,1)-PPSS, ~ Boyen’09
Single-Server PAKE                            
Asymmetric/Augmented PAKE (= “aPAKE”)
 The goal of “asymmetric” PAKE [= client has pwd, server has H(pwd)] :
1. Forces attacker to run a dictionary attack upon server compromise
2. No pre-computation prior to server compromise should help
3. Server should never see the password in plaintext
4. Reduce/eliminate reliance on PKI
5. Performance: Offload hash iterations to client (“key stretching”)
 Password-over-TLS:           1, 2                  3, 4, 5         
 PKI-free aPAKE:                1, 3, 4               2, 5
 X-PAKE:                   1, 2, 3, 4, 5
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X-PAKE: recall Sphinx/DE-PAKE [JKSS16/17]
52
Kd
a = (H(pwd))r
b = aKd
rwd = b1/r  
= H(pwd))Kd
rwd
3
5
2
4
r$
(onetime)
• pwd:  user’s master key typed on Client     ;     Kd : PRF key held by Device
• rwd = PRF(Kd , pwd, urlSrv):  pseudorandom “password” used for Server
1
pwd
From Sphinx/DE-PAKE to X-PAKE
53
Ku a = (H(pwd))
r
b = aKu
rwd = b1/r  
Step 1:  Let Web Server run the Device (Oblivious PRF) code, denote Kd as Ku
r$
(onetime)
= H(pwd))Ku
pwd
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a = (H(pwd))r
b = aKu
rwd = b1/r  
Step 1:  Let Web Server run the Device (Oblivious PRF) code, denote Kd as Ku
Step 2:  Use rwd to bootstrap an Authenticated Key Agreement with S
• S stores x=(PKS,PKU,SKU) encrypted as c=AuthEnc(rwd , x)
• S deliver c to the client, who decrypts (PKS,PKU,SKU) using rwd
• S and U run AKE on resp. inputs (PKS,PKU)+SKS and (PKS,PKU)+SKU
r$
(onetime)
From Sphinx/DE-PAKE to X-PAKE
c=AuthEnc(rwd,(PKS,PKU,SKU))
Global: (PKS,SKS) 
= H(pwd))Ku
Per User: PKU, Ku
(PKS,PKU,SKU)  AuthEnc(rwd,c)
pwd
SK=HMQV(s, y, gu, gx)
X-PAKE with HMQV AKE (single round)
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infoU
s, KU
U,  a = (H(pwd))r,  gx
infoU,  b = a
Ku,   gy pwd
1
= {gu, gs, c=AuthEnc(rwd, (gs,gu,u)), Commit(rwd,pwd)}
rwd = b1/r  ; (gs,gu,u) = AuthDec(rwd,c)
check commitment ;  SK=HMQV(u, x, gs, gy)
• x,y:  one-time Diffie-Hellman exponents chosen by resp. C and S
• Single round (one message per party, add’l one for explicit auth)  
• HMQV complexity (~ Diffie-Hellman KE)  +  1 exp for S,  2 exp for U
r 
(onetime)
X-PAKE
 X-PAKE: X is for “ECS” (Enhanced Client-Server) PAKE 
 No reliance on PKI
 Server never sees password, not even at init (good against pwd reuse)
 Private salt: Attacker cannot pre-compute dictionary 
 No other PKI-free aPAKE achieves this! 
 Hash iterations can be offloaded to user [Boyen’09]
 No other aPAKE w/private salt (incl PKI-based) achieves this!
 Hedged PKI: TLS-protected PAKE vs PAKE-protected TLS         
(+ hidden pwd + offload iterations)
 If PKI acceptable can use rwd as client signature key and TLS client auth
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Summary
 Password vulnerabilities: A serious problem endangering everything 
from our privacy to social well-being to national security.
 Yet, we showed that password insecurity is not inevitable
 “Blinded Diffie-Hellman” OPRF to the rescue in 3 applications:
1. Password store with perfect security (device-based and/or online)
2. Password protected secret sharing (multi-server secret protection      
with a single memorized password)
3. X-PAKE: Asymmetric PAKE with extra (ordinary) properties                
(PKI-free, private salt, client iterated, …)
 All schemes backed by security models and proofs of security 
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Thanks!
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Mature, efficient, simple technology,     
just waiting to be deployed…
Please contact us if you are interested in the 
prototypes of presented schemes.
Next page:   referenced publications
Referenced Publications
Password Store / SPHINX / DE-PAKE:
[JKSS’16]: Jarecki, Krawczyk, Shirvanian, Saxena, Device-Enhanced Password Protocols with Optimal 
Online-Offline Protection, AsiaCCS 2016: 177-188
[JKSS’17]: Jarecki, Krawczyk, Shirvanian, Saxena, SPHINX: A Password Store that Perfectly Hides 
Passwords from Itself. ICDCS 2017: 1094-1104
Secret-Shared Password Store / Password-Protected Secret Sharing (PPSS)
[BJSL’11]: Bagherzandi, Jarecki, Saxena, Lu, Password-protected secret sharing. CCS 2011: 433-444
[JKK’14]: Jarecki, Kiayias, Krawczyk, Round-Optimal Password-Protected Secret Sharing and T-PAKE 
in the Password-Only Model. ASIACRYPT 2014: 233-253
[JKKX’16]: Jarecki, Kiayias, Krawczyk, Xu, Highly-Efficient and Composable Password-Protected 
Secret Sharing (Or: How to Protect Your Bitcoin Wallet Online). EuroS&P 2016: 276-291
[JKKX’17]: Jarecki, Kiayias, Krawczyk, Xu, TOPPSS: Cost-Minimal Password-Protected Secret 
Sharing Based on Threshold OPRF. ACNS 2017: 39-58
Two-Factor Authentication (TFA):
[SJSN’14]: Shirvanian, Jarecki, Saxena, Nathan, Two-Factor Authentication Resilient to Server 
Compromise Using Mix-Bandwidth Devices. NDSS 2014
59
 Thank You!
Questions?
Please take our survey.
 About the CTSC Webinar Series
●
○
●
○
The CTSC Webinar Series is supported by National Science Foundation grant #1547272.
The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily 
representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the NSF. 
 We thank the National Science Foundation (grant 1547272) for supporting our work.
The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the author and should not be interpreted as necessarily 
representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the NSF. 
